Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1987

The State of Utah v. Karen Marie Johnson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
Debra K. Loy, Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Johnson, No. 870222 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/463

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR TlkE STATE OJV^AH

4J WDC
KF
50
.A1
DOCKET NO.

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

<nC9Q3< #

Case No. 8?0222-CA

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,

priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from judgment and conviction for Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a class A Misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial
District court in and for Salt Lake county, State of Utah, the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding.
DEBRAjK. LOY
JOAN <fc. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DAVID L. WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 860222-CA

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from judgment and conviction for Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Raymond S. Uno, presiding.
DEBRA K. LOY
JOAN C. WATT
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC
333 South Second East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DAVID L. WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT:
POINT I.

THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON TO RUN A
WARRANTS CHECK VIOLATED THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.

POINT II. THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED
UTAH STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. . .
CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
PAGE
CASES CITED
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391,
L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)

6

Johnson v. State, 601 S.W. 2d 326 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980)
(pet cert den June 30, 1980)

6

State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986)

8, 12

State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987)

5, 7

State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984)

10

State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985)

9

State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Ut. App. 1987)

9, 11

State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)

5, 6, 7

State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978)

10

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d. 889 (1968)

7, 9

U.S. v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1973)

6, 12

U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980) (plurality op) . . .
U.S. v. Merritt, 732 F.2d 223 (5th Cir., 1984)

.

5

5, 7, 11

STATUTES CITED
United States Constitution, Amendment IV

4,9

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14

9

Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended)

iii .

10, 12

TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides:
77-7-15 • Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop
any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.

iv.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the officer's detention of Ms. Johnson, a

passenger in a motor vehicle stopped for faulty brake lights,
violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution?
2.

Did the officer's detention of Ms. Johnson to run a

warrants check violate Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) and
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution?

v.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §77-35-26(b)(1) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(e), whereby the defendant in a district court criminal
action may taken an appeal from a final judgment and conviction of
any crime other than a first degree or capital felony.

vi.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

v.

:

KAREN MARIE JOHNSON,

:

Cqse No. 860222-CA

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor, in
violation of U.C.A. §58-37-8 (1953 as amended).

Ms. Johnson was

found guilty on April 1, 1987, after a bench trial in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, Judge, presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On November 3, 1986, at approximately 3:00 p.m., Deputy
Stroud of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's office stopped a vehicle
with a broken brakelight at 3200 South, 900 East (T. 5-6).
According to the officer, he ran a check on the license plates of
the vehicle prior to the actual stop, and obtained the name of the
registered owner (T. 6 ) .
After stopping the vehicle, the officer approached and
asked the driver for identification.

She produced a driver's

license but was unable to produce registration which the officer
requested when he learned that the driver was not the registered
owner (T. 6 ) .

After asking the driver for registration, the officer
asked the passenger, Karen Johnson, for identification (T. 6-7).
She told the officer she did not have identification, but gave him
her name and date of birth.

The officer took the driver's license

and the information from Ms. Johnson back to his vehicle, where he
ran a warrants check (T. 7 ) . He told the driver and Ms. Johnson
that he would be back in a minute and indicated that he expected Ms.
Johnson to wait while he returned to his car (T. 22).
The officer testified that he went back to his car,
called dispatch, and inquired whether there were any outstanding
warrants on Ms. Johnson (T. 15). He ran a check on Ms. Johnson
"(b)ecause there was a possibility that (the) vehicle could have
been stolen" (T. 7-8). However, he did not run a check to see
whether the car was stolen (T. 12). The officer also testified that
it was not unusual to stop cars and find that the owner was not
driving (T. 17, 18). The car was in fact not stolen (T. 16) and the
only information which made the officer speculate that it might be
stolen was the fact that the registered owner was not driving and
the driver was unable to find registration (T. 7-8). Ms. Johnson
was merely riding with her friend to pick up the child of her
friend's roommate (T. 24).
The officer acknowledged that ascertaining whether Ms.
Johnson had a valid driver's license would not help him determine
whether the car was stolen (T. 15), but claimed that if Ms. Johnson
had outstanding warrants for car theft, he "possibly" would think it
more likely that the vehicle had been stolen (T. 16).
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The officer testified that it was his normal procedure to
obtain the name and date of birth of passengers in a traffic stop
and that he routinely used this practice to pick up people who might
have outstanding warrants (T. 20, 21). Th^ officer was unsure how
much time passed from when he returned to his car until he received
information from dispatch, but knew it was at least several minutes
(T. 19). According to Ms. Johnson, fifteen minutes passed between
the time the officer asked her for her name and the time he returned
(T. 28).
Dispatch informed the officer that the driver had a
suspended drivers license and that Ms. Johnson had outstanding
warrants (T. 8 ) .
The officer arrested Ms. Johnson and incident to that
arrest, searched her bag, producing the evidence with which she was
convicted of the offense in this case (T. 9-11).
Ms. Johnson's testimony differed from that of Officer
Stroud in that she recalled that the officer first took the license
of the driver to his car, then returned in five to ten minutes (T.
26).

She remembered the length of time because she smoked one or

two cigarettes while waiting (T. 26). When he returned, the officer
asked Ms. Johnson to walk back to his car and give him her name and
date of birth.

The officer wrote the information on a clipboard,

then told Ms. Johnson to return to and sit in the vehicle in which
she had been riding (T. 27).
Prior to trial, Ms. Johnson, by and through counsel,
filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized from her person or
property on the grounds that all items seized were the fruit of an
- 3 -

unlawful seizure of her person in violation of the Fourth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution (R. 14-15).

See Addendum A.

The trial court held

an evidentiary hearing on the motion, after which it denied the
motion to suppress "unless defendant can submit law to the contrary"
(R. 17).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Ms. Johnson, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a
traffic citation, was seized when the officer requested her name and
indicated that she wait while he ran a warrants check on her.
Because he lacked a reasonable suspicion to justify such detention,
Ms. Johnson's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution were violated and the evidence seized should have been
suppressed.
The seizure of Ms. Johnson also violated her rights under
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the statutory
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

_ 4 _

While this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have
recognized that not all encounters between police and citizens
amount to "seizures11 (See State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah
1987); State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987)), where a
"seizure" does occur, the requirements of the Fourth Amendment apply.
In State v, Deitman, supra, the Utah Supreme Court quoted
United States v. Merritt, 732 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984) in setting
forth three levels of interaction between police and citizens:
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime
[sic] and pose questions so long as the citizen is
not detained against his will; (2) an officer may
seize a person if the officer has an "articulable
suspicion" that the person has committed or is about
to commit a crime; however, the "detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable
cause to believe an offense has been committed or is
being committed. [citation omitted]
State v. Deitman, supra at 617-18.
As this court pointed out in footnote 3 of State v.
Trujillo, supra at 87, "(a) majority of the United States Supreme
Court has been unable to agree on the precise parameters of when a
"seizure11 occurs ... 1fstop and frisk" situations.
omitted]

[citations

The Trujillo court stated"(a) seizure within the meaning

of the Fourth Amendment occurs only when the officer by means of
physical force or show of authority has in some way restricted the
liberty of a person" Id. at 87 citing United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544 (1980)(plurality opinion),

A seizure occurs when a

reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the
incident, believes he is not free to leave. United States v.
Mendenhall, supra at 554.
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In State v. Trujillo, supra at 87-88, this Court pointed
out that a seizure "does not occur when a police officer merely
approaches an individual on the street and questions him, if the
person is willing to listen."

(citations omitted).

While a brief

encounter with a citizen on the street may not amount to a "seizure"
within some circumstances, the stop of a motor vehicle is a
detention of the driver and occupants of that vehicle.

See Delaware

v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
In United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89 (CA9 1973), the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals required that the officer have a
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts in order to detain
the defendant for a warrants check after issuing a citation to him
for jaywalking.

The Court reasoned that the officer seized the

defendant when he asked the defendant to come to the police car.
Thereafter, the officer exceeded the scope of the detention when he
ran a warrants check after issuing a citation.
In Johnson v. State, 601 S.W.2d 326 (Tenn. Cr. App.
1980), (pet. cert. den. June 30, 1980), the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals held that a police officer, after stopping a
vehicle for a traffic citation, did not have a right, absent a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that the passenger was involved in
criminal activity, to check the passenger.

In that case, after

stopping the vehicle, the officer walked to the passenger side and
opened the door to "check the passenger."

The marijuana found as a

result of opening the door and checking the passenger was suppressed.
The contact between Ms. Johnson and Officer Stroud was a
seizure requiring an articulable suspicion based on objective facts
- 6 -

in order to be justified.
States v. Merritt, supra.)

(See State v. Deitman, supra; United
The officer stopped the vehicle in which

Ms. Johnson was riding (T. 5-6). After obtaining her name and date
of birth he ran a warrants check from his vehicle (T. 6-7). He
expected Ms. Johnson to wait for him (T. 22) and Ms. Johnson sat in
the car and waited as she had been told to do (T. 29-30).

According

to the officer, several minutes passed whi^.e he was running the
check (T. 19). According to Ms. Johnson, she waited fifteen minutes
while the officer ran the warrants check (T. 28). Unlike the
defendants in Deitman, Ms. Johnson was not free to leave and she
reasonably believed that the officer was detaining her. In
addition, because she was a passenger in a motor vehicle which the
officer had stopped, she did not have the same physical freedom to
leave that the defendants in Deitman had.
While the initial detention of Ms. Johnson was a
"seizure", it did not amount to an arrest and therefore a reasonable
suspicion based on articulable, objective facts, rather than
probable cause, was required.
Trujillo, supra.

See State v. Deitman, supra; State v.

Because the officer had no such reasonable

suspicion, the detention violated the Fourth Amendment.

See Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed 2d 889 (1968).
The officer could articulate no objective facts upon
which to justify the detention of Ms. Johnson.

While he detained

her in part to see whether she had outstanding warrants, he had no
objective facts upon which to base a belief that such warrants
existed (T. 20-21).

The officer testified that he suspected that

the car in which Ms. Johnson was riding may have been stolen
- 7 -

(T. 7-8). However/ his suspicion was not strong enough to cause him
to run a check on the car to see if it was stolen (T. 12) even
though he had the opportunity to do so and ran a check on Ms.
Johnson to see whether she had warrants for stealing cars (T. 16).
The officer based his speculation that the car might be
stolen on the fact that someone other than the registered owner of
the vehicle was driving and the driver could not find the
registration (T. 13). However, he testified that such a situation
was not unusual (T. 17). The car was in fact not stolen and Ms.
Johnson believed that the driver had borrowed it from her roommate
so that the driver could pick up the roommate's child at
kindergarten (T. 16, 24). The record does not establish whether the
officer gave the driver an opportunity to explain her inability to
locate the registration or the circumstances under which she
borrowed the car.
Common sense suggests that an inability to find the
registration is as consistent with the circumstances of a borrowed
car as it is with the circumstances of a stolen car.

To find that

the officer had an articulable suspicion in this case would be to
suggest that all passengers and drivers in borrowed cars are subject
to police detention.

In addition, even if there were an articulable

suspicion that the car was stolen, that suspicion does not
automatically fall on the passenger.

In State v. Banks, 720 P.2d

1380, 1382-83 (1986), the Utah Supreme Court found that "a person's
mere presence in the company of others whom the police have probable
cause to search does not provide probable cause to search that
person."
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Because the officer's detention of Ms. Johnson was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts, the
detention violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.

As a result, the evidence obtained as a result of the

initial illegal detention, including that obtained in the search of
Ms. Johnson's bag, should be suppressed in accordance with Terry v.
Ohio, supra.
POINT II, THE DETENTION OF MS. JOHNSON VIOLATED
UTAH STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oatlfi or affirmation,
particularly describing the pla£e to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
While the Utah Supreme Court has followed the Fourth Amendment
standard in deciding search and seizure cases argued under the Utah
Constitution, (See State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 59 (Utah App. 1987),
nothing prevents Utah from analyzing this Constitutional provision
differently from the federal approach, especially in a case such as
this where there is no Fourth Amendment case on point.
In State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 3171, 321 (Alaska 1985), the
Alaska Supreme Court found that it should "construe Alaska's
constitutional provisions such as Article I, Section 14 as affording
additional rights to those granted by the United States Supreme
Court under the federal constitution."

The Court in Jones chose to

apply a more rigorous test to determine probable cause under Alaska
law than is required under the federal constitution.
- 9 -

The Washington

Supreme Court made a similar choice in State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d
136 (Wash. 1984),

In Jackson, the Court found that the Washington

Constitution provided greater protections then did the federal
constitution to the citizens of that state against unreasonable
searches and seizures by police.

Id. at 143.

In State v. Williams, 366 So. 2d 1369 (La. 1978), an
officer stopped a vehicle to issue a citation, and ordered the
passengers out of the car. As one of the passengers was getting
out, the officer noticed a sawed off shotgun in the car.
The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that:
(B)y stopping the automobile the police have decided
that the driver will be detained. Such is not the
case for the passenger, who has not broken the law
and who may walk away from the scene unless the
police officer has some other legitimate reason to
detain him. Certainly the passenger has a higher
expectation of privacy than the driver, because the
passenger plays no part in the routine traffic
infraction and has reason to suppose that any
exchange with the authorities will be conducted by
the driver alone.
The Williams Court, without deciding the Fourteenth
Amendment issue, held that under the Louisiana Constitution the
detention of the passengers was not permissible.
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) provides:
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may stop
any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or
is in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
The language of U.C.A. §77-7-15 indicates an intent on
the part of Utah's legislature to provide the citizens of this state
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with greater protection than is provided by the federal constitution
as interpreted in United States v. Merritt, supra.
Pursuant to this statute, a peace officer may stop a
person only when the officer has a "reasonable suspicion" that
criminal activity has occurred or is about to occur. Hence, while
the United States Constitution may allow for police citizen
encounters absent a reasonable suspicion (See United States v.
Merritt, supra), the Utah Legislature has provided otherwise,
requiring a police officer to have a reasonable suspicion to stop
and question a person.

Hence, Utah statutory and constitutional law

require a reasonable suspicion to stop and question an individual,
even where the detention does not amount to a "seizure" under the
Fourth Amendment.
As outlined in Point I, the officer "seized" Ms. Johnson
when he detained her to run a warrants check (See discussion at 5-7)
(See also State v. Larocco, _supr-.
constitutes a "seizure").

->r discussion of what

The language of the statute shows that in

Utah, any detention for the purpose of asking an individual's name
amounts to a seizure.

However, even if this court does not agree

that any detention where the officer asks a person for
identification amounts to a seizure pursuant to Utah statutory and
constitutional law, the detention of Ms. Johnson in this case was a
seizure of her person.

The officer detained Ms, Johnson for

anywhere from several to fifteen minutes (T. 19, 28). The officer
did more than merely obtain information regarding Ms. Johnson's
identity.

He expected her to remain in the car while he ran a

warrants check; she was not free to leave and therefore was
- 11 -

detained.

As the Court in United States v. Luckett, supra, found

requiring a defendant to wait while a warrants check was run
constituted a detention.
The officer in this case had no objective facts upon
which to base a reasonable suspicion to justify the detention of Ms.
Johnson.

The officer did know whether the car was stolen, nor did

he run a check to find out even though he had the opportunity to do
so (T. 12). Even if the car had been stolen (which it was not),
there was nothing to connect Ms. Johnson to a crime which may have
been committed by the driver (See State v. Banks, supra).

The

officer had a hunch which later proved to be incorrect; a hunch does
not amount to a reasonable suspicion.
The detention by the officer to check for outstanding
warrants also constitutes a violation of Utah Code Ann. Section
77-7-15 (1953 as amended).

Pursuant to the statute, an officer must

have reasonable suspicion before questioning a person about her name
and address.

Under the facts of the instant case, no such suspicion

could have attached to Ms. Johnson.
As officers lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the
detention of Ms. Johnson, the evidence that flowed from the unlawful
seizure should have been suppressed.
CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Johnson
requests this Court to reverse the conviction and the trial court's
ruling on the motion to suppress and remand this case to the trial
court with an order to suppress the evidence, and dismiss the
charges or provide for a new trial without such evidence.
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Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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Defendant.
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attorney of record, DEBRA K. LOY, and hereby moves the Court to
Suppress all evidence seized from her person or property including
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on the grounds said items were the fruit of an unlawful seizure of her
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